greater popular and electoral appeal. (Even in mid-2016, Rudd's 1.65 million Twitter followers still place him over one million followers ahead both of his 2013 challenger Tony Abbott and of current PM Malcolm Turnbull.) By 2013, the majority of federal members and candidates operated Facebook and/or Twitter profiles (if with widely varying degrees of care and enthusiasm), and many party organisations paid close attention to their social media campaigning activities. This article, then, explores the key patterns both in how politicians and their parties campaigned on Twitter during the 2013 federal election, and in how the public responded to and engaged with these campaigns.
Methods and Data
The adoption of social media platforms as campaigning tools is mirrored by a similar adoption of increasingly sophisticated social media research tools by media and communication scholars. There is little information about whether and how Facebook and Twitter may have been experimented with by campaigners in the 2007 election largely also because there were no easily accessible tools for capturing such experiments. By 2010, such tools had become available, but overwhelmingly focussed on capturing tweets that contained specific keywords and hashtags; the fact that contemporary studies such as Bruns & Burgess (2011) and Burgess & Bruns (2012) , focussing on the election hashtag #ausvotes, found the discussion to be unrepresentative of broader public debate may be due also to the self-selecting nature of any such hashtag dataset (cf. . It is possible in principle that themes such as refugee policy, climate change, or same-sex marriage were discussed more widely on Twitter than it appears from such studies, but that these discussions took place largely outside of the discursive space of #ausvotes.
The tools and technologies for capturing and analysing social media data that had become available by 2013 allowed for a considerably more comprehensive analysis. In 2013, ahead of the official start of the campaign on 5 August, we used manual searches on the Twitter Website to identify the accounts of current Members and Senators, and of the candidates announced to date; we further updated this list after the official declaration of candidate nominations on 16 August. In total, this process identified 361 accounts: 117 Australian Labor Party (ALP) candidate accounts, 100 accounts by candidates of the conservative Coalition (including 68 Liberal Party, 19 LNP, 12 National Party, and 1 Country Liberal Party accounts), 68 Greens accounts, 27 Palmer United Party (PUP) accounts, 19 Katter's Australia Party (KAP) accounts, and 66 minor party and independent candidate accounts. Throughout the campaign period and until election day on 7 September, we then captured all public tweets by these accounts, as well as all public tweets mentioning them by their Twitter username (including both @mentions and retweets, and excluding only tweets from accounts marked as 'private'). Data were gathered using yourTwapperkeeper (2016), running on a server provided by the Australian scholarly cloud computing network NeCTAR. We combined these tweets into one consolidated dataset. For the campaign period of 5 August to 7 September 2013, this resulted in a dataset of nearly 658,000 unique tweets from just over 77,000 distinct Twitter accounts. Data analytics were performed in Tableau.
We chose this more complex approach over the simpler method of tracking the #ausvotes hashtag because hashtags represent only a self-selecting sample of all the tweets that relate to a given topic: users make a conscious choice of whether to include a hashtag (and thereby make their contribution visible to the imagined audience that follows the hashtag) or not (and thus keep the tweet visible only to their own followers; cf. Marwick & boyd, 2011) . Especially with high-profile hashtags such as #ausvotes or the more general politics hashtag #auspol (cf. Sauter & Bruns, 2015; Zappavigna, 2014) , to include the hashtag might mean to invite heated responses or personal animosity; it is therefore likely that many users commenting on the campaign would shy away from using #ausvotes as they express their political views on Twitter.
To reference a political candidate in one's tweet has different consequences. To @mention the account even of then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd or Opposition Leader Tony Abbott does not change the potential visibility of the tweet in the way that including #ausvotes does: primarily, it simply brings the tweet to the attention of the candidate. This may be the intended effect especially with tweets that commend or criticise specific policies, or request information or action. Thus, our approach offers a different and more diverse perspective on how Twitter users commented on the 2013 election; this is borne out by the fact that only some 64,000 of the tweets in our account-centric dataset (less than one tenth) also contained the hashtag #ausvotes.
That said, an even more comprehensive analysis would focus not just on hashtags or candidate accounts, but would also track all potentially important keywords as well as activities around the accounts of journalists and civil society actors. Such broad-based tracking was well beyond what most data gathering tools available by 2013 were able to support, however, and also introduces the considerable challenge of reliably distinguishing general discussion about issues such as climate change from specifically election-related conversations.
Common to both our 2013 approach and to previous studies is a focus on Twitter over the more widely used Facebook. This is for practical as well as ethical reasons, as it is both difficult and problematic to extract a representative and reliable dataset of election-related conversations from the semi-private spaces of Facebook; our present focus on Twitter is justified because its considerably more open structure means that much of the fully public social media debate about the election does take place on Twitter rather than Facebook. This publicness also means that such debate is in turn represented more strongly again also in journalistic coverage of the election. From this perspective, Twitter certainly does not reflect the attitudes of the Australian public at large -but it represents a disproportionately influential subset of wider public debate.
These intersections between social and mainstream media can be quantified. Skogerbø et al. (2016: 117) have already shown that in the weeks preceding the 2013 federal election "tweets were included into
[mainstream] election coverage regularly in Australia", proportionally more so than in the lead-up to roughly contemporaneous elections in Norway and Sweden. They regard this as evidence that "Twitter contributes … to agenda-setting and agenda-building in Australia" (ibid.). Conversely, Twitter is also known to serve as an important conduit for the dissemination of news content (see Kümpel et al., 2015 , for a detailed overview of the literature), suggesting considerable agenda-setting processes flowing in the opposite direction -from mainstream to social media. To analyse the dynamics of such flows, we resolved all short URLs found in our dataset to their final destination, and identified the most influential media sources.
Analysis and Discussion
The 2013 election took place against the backdrop of a considerable decline in the Australian Labor Party's electoral fortunes. The 2010 election had resulted in an ALP minority government under the leadership of controversial Prime Minister Julia Gillard; Gillard herself was replaced as PM by her predecessor Kevin Rudd in a Labor leadership spill on 26 June 2013 largely in order to improve the ALP's chances of avoiding a comprehensive defeat -in Australian political parlance, an attempt to at least 'save the furniture' by retaining as many seats as possible, even if an outright victory was highly unlikely. By contrast, the conservative Coalition under Opposition Leader Tony Abbott benefitted substantially from the government's unpopularity and appeared virtually assured of success, barring any significant missteps on the campaign trail. These notable differences are also reflected in the range of accounts that tweeted most actively throughout the campaign. For all major parties, activity was distributed unevenly across the party candidates:
Activities by Candidates
in each case, a handful of candidates tweeted considerably more than their colleagues, while others did not tweet at all. Such long-tail activity distributions are common in many communicative contexts, including on
Twitter. More significant, however, are differences in the composition of these most active groups. Table 2 presents a count of tweets posted by the twenty most active accounts for ALP, Coalition, and Greens, as well as the median count calculated across all candidate accounts for each party grouping.
The ALP group features only six senior leaders' accounts: Deputy PM Anthony Albanese, cabinet ministers Penny Wong and Mark Butler, and members of the outer ministry Mike Kelly, Kate Lundy, and Kate Ellis. It is dominated, by contrast, by a number of rank-and-file candidates -some of whom are past office holders (such as former Queensland Premier Peter Beattie, as @smartstate1, or former federal minister Craig Emerson, who appears twice as he changed his account name in mid-campaign), but who did not belong to the then current Labor leadership team. In spite of his well-established affinity for social media, PM Rudd does not appear amongst the most active ALP accounts: he posted only 95 tweets during the campaign. These differences may again be read, in the case of the Coalition, as controlling the message by centring tweeting activity on the inner circle of frontbenchers. Whether these politicians posted their own tweets or had campaign staff do so, such senior party leaders are likely to take relatively few significant missteps, compared to less experienced rank-and-file candidates. The centralisation is in line with a 'small target' strategy, in essence drawing supporters' as well as critics' attention to these senior leaders as what might be described not as 'small', but as known targets, while diverting the spotlight from unproven campaigners. To a lesser extent, the same may be true for Greens candidates -although here the picture is somewhat more mixed, and Senator Milne clearly serves as the most active, most visible face of the party.
For the ALP, the pattern diverges considerably: here, two explanations appear most likely, and are not mutually exclusive. First, after the bitter internal struggles within the party in the years leading up to the 2013 election, and in the face of seemingly certain defeat, it seems possible that some senior frontbenchers did not feel motivated to campaign to their full capacity, on Twitter or elsewhere. Second, this created space for social media experimentation by less prominent local candidates, who -absent coordinated action by party headquarters -may have been especially motivated to devise their own strategies to at least limit the magnitude of the impending defeat.
This interpretation would also provide an online counterpart to observations by journalists that local ALP candidates were particularly active at door-knocking in their electorates during the 2013 campaign, and a similar emphasis, in Labor's own review of the 2013 campaign (Garrett & Dick, n.d.) , on the results of local campaigning even in an otherwise unsuccessful election. In essence, Labor sought to draw voters' attention away from the parliamentary party's problems, and towards the more immediate choice of local representatives. This combination of offline and online engagement in the electorate -a local target strategywas also an important factor in independent candidate Cathy McGowan's victory against Coalition frontbencher Sophie Mirabella in the electorate of Indi, against an overall swing of the national vote towards the Coalition (Legge, 2013 (While available space does not permit a full discussion, there was similarly heightened activity from local ALP candidates about to be defeated in the 2012 Queensland state election, with several of these candidates returned to parliament in the 2015 election Bruns, 2015) ; however, more fundamental factors than the level of online campaigning will certainly have been responsible for the enormous swings towards LNP and ALP, respectively, in these two state elections.)
Tweets Mentioning Candidates
How politicians tweet represents only one side of the election picture. As important -arguably more so -is how ordinary Twitter users engage with their accounts, respond to their posts, and retweet their tweets.
Whatever the amount of effort expended by parties and politicians in their own tweeting activities, only this public response indicates whether such effort is also bearing fruit in the form of increased attention. As noted, in addition to the candidates' own tweets we also captured all tweets mentioning these candidates by their account name -including unsolicited @mentions, @replies to prior tweets by the candidates, and retweets of their posts (through the retweet button and in the form of manual retweets using RT @user and similar conventions). This discrepancy may be explained precisely by their minor party status: such parties receive more limited mainstream media coverage, while perhaps attracting more committed supporters. To the extent that these supporters are on Twitter, they may therefore feel a greater need to amplify their candidates' messages through retweeting. From this perspective it is unsurprising that Pirate Party supporters -who may generally be more technology-and thus also Twitter-affine -should be most enthusiastic about retweeting their candidates; by contrast, the sub-par performance of WikiLeaks Party supporters is unexpected. A less favourable interpretation, however, also rings true: along with more limited mainstream media coverage, the minor parties also receive considerably less overall attention on Twitter, as the total mention figures in Table 3 demonstrate. It is therefore easier for the retweets posted by a small number of supporters to amount to a greater percentage of all candidate mentions for these parties.
Tweet
By contrast, major party candidates are talked about (and talked at) in a very large volume of tweets, very few of which are retweets. Here, in particular, a comparison of the number of tweets posted by each party's candidates, and the number of retweets received, is useful. ALP candidates received 8,751 retweets for the 16,017 tweets they posted, while Coalition candidates received 6,753 retweets for their 7,285 tweets; on average, this translates to a retweeting ratio of roughly 1 in 2 for Labor, and 9 in 10 for the Coalition.
(However, such averages mask greater complexity: retweeting attention is very unevenly distributed, with a handful of tweets receiving the vast majority of all retweets.) Overall, thus, Twitter users were considerably more prepared to retweet Coalition than Labor messages during the 2013 election, even if the total number of retweets received still favours the ALP.
But the vast majority of tweets simply @mention or @reply to candidate accounts. Such attention, too, is very unevenly distributed, and strongly favours the Prime Ministerial candidates -who for both ALP and Coalition each attract half or more of all mentions received by their respective parties ( 
Themes
A brief overview of key themes addressed in the Twitter discussion is similarly instructive. A detailed manual coding of all 658,000 tweets, or of a substantial sample, was beyond the scope of the research project. Instead, we drew on the key themes identified by media monitoring company iSentia as the most mentioned issues in the Australian media in 2013 (iSentia, 2013) , and on the key campaign issues listed by ABC News' 2013 "Vote Compass" (ABC News, 2013 . In combination, these provide a contemporary reflection of themes in both media coverage and voter interests, the presence of which we can assess in our dataset.
To do so, we iteratively constructed several collections of filter terms. From the iSentia list, we excluded the non-political topics 'bushfires' and 'drugs in sport', and the generic theme 'federal election'; we also excluded 'Gillard vs. Rudd' as it would be impossible to determine for each mention of Kevin Rudd whether he is being discussed predominantly in the context of his struggle with Julia Gillard for the Prime Ministership. For similar reasons, we excluded 'trust' from the Vote Compass list. We combined the remaining themes from both lists into one master list, consolidating related themes. Finally, we added two themes missing from both lists that nonetheless appeared potentially relevant to the campaign: terrorism, as an extension of the 'Defence' theme (because of continuing security concerns relating especially to Islamist terror groups) and sexism (because of persistent public criticism -not least from former PM Gillard -of Tony Abbott's attitudes towards women).
This process resulted in 13 key themes: Agriculture Policy; Budget and Economy; Defence and Terrorism;
Education; Environment and Climate Change; Health; Internet Policy; Manufacturing and Mining Industry;
Refugee Policy; Same-Sex Marriage; Sexism; Transport Policy; and Workplace Relations. For each theme, we identified several keywords that were both likely to be used in discussions related to these themes, and sufficiently unique to avoid false positives. All keywords were implemented as regular expressions capturing all relevant variations of the same term (e.g. 'tax'/'taxes'), while excluding false positives (e.g. 'coal', but not 'coalition').
We tested these keywords by reviewing the thirty most frequently retweeted messages for each theme, observing both any false positives captured by the initial set of keywords and any additional, new themespecific keywords emerging from these tweets. We similarly reviewed the top thirty messages amongst the tweets that did not contain any of our initial keywords, in order to identify any relevant keywords not yet used.
We repeated this revision process several times, until we had eliminated false positives and identified all thematically relevant keywords that appeared through this process. Finally, we ordered our keyword tests to maximise their specificity: for instance, we tested for terms such as 'carbon' and 'mining' ahead of testing for 'tax', so that mentions of 'carbon tax' and 'mining tax' were counted towards the themes Environment and Climate Change or Manufacturing and Mining Industry, respectively, rather than towards the more generic 'Budget and Economy' (which captured all other mentions of 'tax').
Using these keyword sets, we allocated all tweets that contained at least one of these terms to their respective themes. In total, more than 150,000 tweets -23% of the total dataset -contained one or more of the keywords identified. The ranked list of themes in Table 5 For the Australian Twittersphere, the greater presence of budget concerns and environmental and social issues, in addition to Internet Policy themes, also indicates a shift in focus since the 2010 federal election, when much of the discussion was dominated by the NBN and Labor's proposal of a national Internet filter (Burgess & Bruns, 2012) . Such a shift may result from changes in the overall composition of the Australian Twitter userbase, away from a smaller community dominated by technology-affine netizens and towards a broader selection of Australians (which nonetheless remains unlikely to be representative of the overall population). However, the differences in data gathering methods between Burgess & Bruns (2012) , who tracked the #ausvotes hashtag, and our study, which examined tweets by and to candidate accounts, may also have contributed to such different patterns.
Themes Tweets Vote Compass
Budget and Economy (budget, debt, deficit, fiscal, financ*, treasur*, MYEFO, superann*, GST, econom*, GFC, tax, costings, surplus, savings) We note that the themes as presently defined account for just under one quarter of the total volume of tweets captured during the election period. This is not unexpected, as tweets by and to candidates may serve a range of other functions beyond discussing policy, and as even policy-related tweets may not always explicitly include such keywords (but could simply say "@candidate I disagree with your position"). Further refinement of the keywords is certainly possible, and manual identification and coding of follow-on discussion would inevitably change the patterns observed. This would be highly labour-intensive, however, and was well beyond the scope of the present study.
URLs Shared
Just as these themes do not match closely the dominant preoccupations of mainstream media coverage during the campaign, the Twitter-based interactions and discussions captured in our candidate-centred dataset engage with media sources external to Twitter only to a relatively limited degree. Only 20% of the tweets in our dataset include links; of these, more than one quarter linked to material hosted on Twitter itself (typically, embedded images or videos), and nearly one quarter consisted of t.co short URLs that could not be resolved to their intended destination (often because the short URL had been truncated during retweeting). This leaves some 70,000 tweets containing resolvable links to external sources, representing just under 11% of all tweets.
Given the well-established role that Twitter plays -in Australia and internationally -as a medium for the dissemination of news (Kümpel et al., 2015; , such limited linking to external media may appear surprising. However, it is important to stress that our dataset is designed specifically around tweets by and @mentions of candidates. Such tweets should be expected to be more strongly interpersonal and conversational than informational; while they may be used by ordinary Twitter users to confront political candidates with information from media sources, or by candidates to share additional campaign material, such uses are unlikely to dominate our data. Rather, in the context of our dataset the limited presence of URLs documents the use of Twitter to talk about, at, or with candidates.
Where URLs were present, they reflect a strong concentration on a limited number of mainstream news sources, as well as significant intersections between Twitter and other social media platforms (Table 6 ). 
Conclusion
This article has analysed the patterns of activity on Twitter by the candidates in the 2013 Australian federal election, and the patterns in the responses these candidates received from ordinary Twitter users. Our analysis has shown marked differences in the approaches to Twitter that were taken by the various parties and their candidates: Labor candidates, especially beyond the immediate leadership team, were generally more active users of Twitter, while Coalition tweeting activities were focussed on the frontbench and left relatively little space for extensive tweeting by rank-and-file candidates. These patterns are consistent with the parties' differing starting positions: riven by internal tensions after four years of leadership instability, Labor's campaign remained disjointed and left local candidates to experiment with their own approaches to 'saving the furniture', while a resurgent Coalition, widely predicted to win government, could afford to run a 'small target' campaign on Twitter as much as elsewhere.
The popular response to the candidates on Twitter, however, proved largely disconnected from such strategy settings: ordinary Twitter users preferred talking about and at candidate accounts, rather than widely retweeting the candidates' political messages to their own networks. Their focus of discussion was overwhelmingly on the two contenders for the Prime Ministership, and this is perhaps unsurprising at the end of an electoral cycle that was thoroughly dominated by discussions about leadership; this focus, on Twitter as well as elsewhere in the media, may well indicate a temporary or permanent shift towards a more presidential style of politics even within Australia's parliamentary system.
With yet another replacement of a first-term Prime Minister by his own partyroom in the 2013-16 termthis time on the Coalition side -, and a comparatively united front presented by the new Labor leadership, it will be interesting to see whether patterns of interaction on Twitter in the 2016 campaign mirror those of the 2013 election, with roles reversed between the major parties. It is also possible, however, that changes to the overall demographics of Twitter in Australia, as well as further developments in the parties' use of Twitter and other social media platforms in campaigning, could result in as significant a shift in activity as that observed between the 2010 and 2013 campaigns.
